At the Davos forum, notably slavivshii his status, came the most representative of the Chinese delegation in history, headed by XI Jinping. His speeches leave no doubt that Beijing is highly concerned about the new owner of the Oval office. Such an open demonstration of anxiety raises the question: will China be able to defend their claim to superpower status?
Chinese President XI Jinping in part of his massive European tour, spoke at the United Nations in Geneva, where he made a significant statement that China will attempt to “build a new model of relations with the US and comprehensive strategic partnership with Russia – the partnership for peace, growth, reform among the various European civilizations. The partnership of the unity and cooperation of the BRICS countries”.
Although technically it si was devoted to the economy, it is obvious that the basis of his speeches at Davos, and Geneva as a European trip as such, are primarily political reasons, specifically the preparation of China’s serious call, which promises China the arrival of the White house of Donald trump. So it is no coincidence the European tour of the Chinese leader is on the eve of the inauguration of the 45th President of the United States.
The trip of XI, like his rhetoric in the course of it, testify to the apparent anxiety of Beijing in connection with the new owner of the Oval office. As you know, the election program of the Donald trump carries with it a significant anti-Chinese Bank, primarily in the sphere of economy. The President-elect promised to return production to the United States and the support of domestic industry means a serious blow to foreign competitors, but China, for obvious reasons, is here in the first place.
The performances of si and in Davos, and Geneva are a mixture of very harsh (and sometimes even almost threatening) rhetoric and attempts to offer a new administration a mutually acceptable compromise. So, subjected to harsh criticism of the policy of protectionism, which is a direct attack against trump, C. at the same time promised not to devalue the yuan, which will help the American economy to the detriment of Chinese producers.
The statement of the leader of China in Geneva also clearly has a layered meaning. The mention of a possible revision of the Sino-American relations with a strong emphasis on “comprehensive” (an obvious reference to the military), the partnership (and not simply cooperation) with Russia looks a clear warning to the new administration.
In a strange way this European trip of XI and his performances in the course of it looks rather of weakness than of strength. It seems that Beijing is seriously concerned about the arrival of the White house trump and the consequences it can have for China.
Especially revealing in this regard looks the very part of the si forum in Davos.
As is known, Russia for several years refused to participate in the forum at the highest level. In the same year, the representativeness of the Davos event looks particularly bleak. He was ignored by the leaders of several key countries (Germany, France, Canada), although in previous years there was a tradition of their participation.
China, on the contrary, never was represented in Davos by the highest state officials. As a result, in a situation explicitly downgrade the status of the forum (even temporarily, perhaps) the arrival of the status in the history of the Chinese delegation, headed by the leader of the country looks pretty ambiguous. This is especially strange, considering how much Chinese culture is concerned with issues of status and saving face.
This situation leads one to suspect that Beijing is at least a serious nervous in anticipation of the arrival of the new occupant of the White house. It makes him, on the one hand, to establish additional contacts and look for possible new partners for joint opposition to a common “enemy”, and on the other hand, the rhetoric of the mix tough, almost aggressive abstracts with proposals for constructive cooperation.
Frankly a quandary from China to Russia is relevant in the first place so that it transparently indicates China as a key partner in a possible conflict with the United States.
In this situation, the main question is: do we need that? What is the meaning and the interest of Russia to take one side or another in a possible Sino-American political and economic confrontation, if that happens?
This is especially true given that in previous years, when Russia was under pressure to hard Western pressure, China was limited to a friendly neutrality in our relationship, and any bilateral agreements in recent years with the business component was achieved in tough negotiations with no charity Beijing to Moscow.
China in recent years has actively stated its claim to superpower status, at least in the economic and political sphere. It seems that with the new American administration he will undergo a test of strength and deed to prove their claims. However, the latest steps have not yet created the impression that Beijing is fully confident in his abilities.