The call to ban abortion, which coincided with the government’s optimization of budget expenditures (even if this operation is funded by the MLA), reaffirmed ambiguous, not clearly articulated society, the reputation of the Orthodox Church. This article is not about abortion (they are in the proposed configuration is a special case), and the relations of state, Church and society, where the Orthodox Church has caused hardly less harm than epidemics or war.
In our society there is a misconception about the independence of the ROC from the state, as is customary, for example, Catholics or Protestants. This is not so. By the emergence in Russia of Orthodoxy, we are obliged to Prince Vladimir was at one time Supreme leader of the Russian state. It would be ridiculous if the Grand Duke began to build a Church institution, beyond the control of his influence. So that Orthodoxy in Russia was originally the state religion.
In the Catholic world the “i” in that period was almost placed in the “papal revolution” of the VI and XI centuries in Europe was normative enshrined the primacy of ecclesiastical over secular. First was restricted to the order of hereditary transfer of ownership: Church proclaimed himself the heir of the personal property of the congregation. And then, when the Church property has begun to grow at a frantic pace (and largely to protect the Church’s riches), “God was placed above Caesar”: the key argument was chosen, the threat of excommunication.
Positive externality “papal revolutions” became an active part of the Catholic Church in secular life: the Church created administrative, legal and, importantly, the supranational attributes of the new device, and even managed to change first suspicious-the disapproval of the masses to the market, moneylenders and merchants.
In Russia the conflict “with the proper noun” was not and could not be. Country for a long time, including the Mongol-Tatar invasion, lived by the principle “one state, one religion”, and after a violent transition other Orthodox countries under Ottoman yoke and the fall in 1453 of Constantinople, Muscovy remained the only free centre of Orthodoxy, the “third Rome”. To appoint their bishops of the Russian princes without regard to Constantinople made it a rule in 1448, largely after the consent of the Byzantine rapprochement with the Catholic Rome and the signing of the Florentine Union of 1439 (the Byzantines had hoped that the Latins would save them from the Turks, but as it turned out, in vain.)
Here, by the way, the roots of the mental hostility of the Russian people towards foreigners, the perception of Russia as a besieged fortress, and, of course, unwavering confidence in their own individual and collective uniqueness.
All would be nothing, in the end, ideological and religious structures like ours and to this day exist in different parts of the world, if not for the split in the mid-seventeenth century. Then the state in the person of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich and the Church forces of Patriarch Nikon instead consistently addressed the most urgent for that time the problem of ambiguity in the Church books (something like several decades before it was done by Petro Mohyla in Ukraine, against which, however, it was already suspect) slashed from shoulder.
In 1653, Nikon without congregational approval released “Memory” on which the Russians must now be baptized, and not two fingers, and trenerstvo, eight-pointed crosses were replaced by four-pointed “Latin”, and the departure of many religious rites were declared to be wrong. And, of course, the mass of handwritten Church right, made even more confusion in the key Orthodox tenets. In 1658, when Nikon voluntarily retired, the Protestant reformation was headed by the king personally, bringing it, indulging in the Greek and other Orthodox advisers with “occupied territories” to its logical conclusion on a Large Moscow Sobor of 1666-1667
To say that Russian people do not understand the philosophical demolition — means to say nothing. Up to half of the population refused to obey the new rites, and began the most massive great migration in Russian history — both internal (to the North, the Urals, Siberia) and external (in Lithuania, Belarus, Turkey and even China). The split was accompanied by mass self-immolation (burns): the people, unable to resist the military-state machine called alien doctrines and rituals, preferred to burn, but will not change the faith. By the way, to oppose the king (anointed) for the Russian people meant to rebel against the Almighty.
Power planting ceremonies were accompanied by action within the legal framework: the Conciliar code of 1649 blasphemers (and the dissenters were considered apostates) has the death penalty by burning, whether the guilty ones or not. An outstanding representative of the old believers Avvakum was burned in a house. With other “icons” of the old believers the Church and the state at a cost no less sophisticated: the Boyarynya Feodosia Morozova was starved to death in an earthen prison, but half dead with the Solovetsky monks after the capture of the monastery in January 1676 dumped in the drained moat and let the water into it.
In burned areas was not without inherent today of eschatology (doctrine about the end of the world), promising rebellious miraculous resurrection. This trait of the Russian character in the future was manifested in the unprecedented self-sacrifice during many wars, warmed the souls of the desperate defenders of fortresses and cities was the main reason for the resounding popularity around the world of Russian action “Immortal regiment”. Our ancestors-the heroes rose, and every year, victorious March with us, right?
In 1678-1719. the total number of victims of the split — executed, tortured, samoistseleniya, dead in the road, the unborn — without military casualties in peace, I note the time, amounted to 2.2 million people, or over 12% of the population. Moreover, the whole XVIII century, the population, if you compare with the boundaries of 1646 (statistically proven fact), grows primarily due to the addition of new lands and their inhabitants.
The split gave rise to mass corruption: 15 may 1722, came sinodskoe the law “On regulations on the treatment of dissenters to the Orthodox Church” (the Church at that time naturally became a legal part of the state). Paragraph 22 of the law prescribes to take neopositivist Raskolnikov double salary, and since not everyone in Russia was “ideological” and agreed to pay twice the regular bribes to the clergy for help, that was allegedly on the confession became common. Certificates issued even in absentia, only the fee for them was higher. According to the testimony of those years, the priests devoutly fought for parishes, rich “Nezavisimy” schismatics…
What was the number of believers in pre-revolutionary Russia? According to various estimates, their share in the mid-nineteenth century was more than 20% of the population, or up to 30% of all Orthodox, and in some regions, such as in the Urals and the Russian North, the number of dissenters reached 60-70%.
Is it any wonder the massive “madness” of our ancestors, in the October revolution destroys the alien (or rather, defiled nikonians) churches? The barbarism that occurred after the publication of the provisions of the Treaty talks of the Committee of Ministers of 17 April 1905 “On the strengthening of religious tolerance began”, which in the Wake of the first Russian revolution abolished all persecution of the old believers and persons of other faiths? In truth: actually, the same October 1917 was in part brought prominent entrepreneurs and philanthropists of the old faith.
In modern society to speak about any significant share of dissenters, of course, is not necessary. Revolution, the First world war and the Great Patriotic war in which the believers demonstrated miracles of heroism (the homeland as the mother, for every Russian — Holy), the late Soviet collapse of family values and Gaidar social atomization milled the country, has done its dirty work. Does this mean that the split, firmly engraved in the national character, it is possible to forget? No, not so: is not faced we and our family like most ordinary people, at the same time distinguished by neatness, moderation, hard work, persistence, commitment to solidarity and justice, not knowing that they are dealing with the descendants of the old believers? Scratch Russian — find a Tartar, and schismatic.
The long-term public ideological conflict firmly settled in our minds, has spread as one of the dominant irrational distrust of the state and the Church resulted in the rejection of the current institution of the priesthood, especially against the background of numerous scandals with the Holy fathers. Perhaps every believer at least once and heard the sentence of the Church: “I intermediaries in the relationship with God is not necessary”.
The split and, more broadly, the underestimation of Russian mentality once hobbled public debate about the development of the country, then manifested in the factors that led to unsuccessful reforms (the same Stolypin or Gaidar), and then reflected in the numerous social fires to put out that the government still can not. “We do not know the society in which we live and work”, I believe, once said Andropov?..
Did the Church do anything to eliminate the legacy society, including through its fault of contradictions? Unlikely. And it’s not about repentance, do not laugh, but about a new, modern interpretation of Orthodoxy. About to reach out not to the President or the government, and each nameless person, to each family, each house. And not with morals, or taboos, and with the consolation, help and advice.
And then there’s abortion, my personal attitude which is generally negative. But I as a man wearing an Orthodox cross, I seriously doubt that the current Church has the right to speak on my behalf, and on behalf of my people.