Features military action “English” traditionally differ from war familiar to Americans. There is a difference in the balance: “a strong side” Russia is often a weakness of NATO – and Vice versa. But now even the us military analysts recognize that in some cases Russian “model of war” threatens the United States, accustomed to rely only on aviation, local defeat.
Simultaneously with the deployment of the US missile defense system of NATO countries actively participating in military exercises in Georgia and the Baltic States that can be regarded as another step in escalating the situation around the Russian borders. However, many American experts recently expressed doubt that NATO and the United States will be able effectively to counter a modern army (including Russian), not so much at the technological level, but on the intellectual. The habit of quick and easy victories over inferior militarily against each other for three decades, slowed down the military thought of the Alliance, and now I have to sound the alarm, because of the mismatch between Russian and NATO military strategy of the land forces was too revealing.
Red vs. blue
“No air superiority of the NATO countries and the United States at the time, has led to distortions in the military-industrial complex and R & d of Russia”
The main tool of intellectual assaults in the joint chiefs of staff of the U.S. were and still are “war games” – simulation of actual combat with the use of computer technology. They are held regularly, in some cases, they involve current employees of the civil administration, until the Secretary of state and Vice President. That’s kind of a tradition, stretching from the cold war, and some current employees of the headquarters of sniping, they never thought that the cold war could be so exciting. For its part the “civil” war games often ignore, referring to employment, but now there is evidence that such intellectual assaults became more frequent and give a very ambiguous for the Pentagon results.
Holding such strategic and operational games resembles a cross between a computer game as a psychological test for resistance. During the old cold war computer models did not exist, and with their appearance, rules have become complicated. Now in the Pentagon there are approximately 100 detailed scenarios of armed conflict around the world of varying intensity and about the same “basic introduction” for smaller stories. The main problem with these war games – both sides are people with the same approach and style of thinking, with the same succession of military knowledge and principles.
The correlation of the military potentials of Russia and Netstories in the US “good guys” indicate on maps in blue, and the alleged bad guys in red, on the Russian maps it is exactly the opposite; the roots of it are in the War for independence: in the red uniforms of the British and blue of the Continental army of George Washington. And some time ago at the headquarters of NATO with interest noticed an unexpected metamorphosis that took place with the graduates of West point, assigned to the “fight for red”. They quickly began to behave “on the battlefield” extremely aggressive, especially in offensive actions. In turn, their colleagues, who played for the “blue” (NATO), avoided risks, acted slowly and carefully. For example, the “Reds” made good progress on the road, not paying attention to the loss of tanks and giving the crews the right to solve our own personal problems. And most interestingly, by the end of “hostilities”, which are carefully documented for further analysis, loss quickly the advancing “red” turned out to be much less than the losses allegedly careful and avoiding excessive casualties “blue”. So the “Reds” began to win. Always. Often very quickly.
There followed a long intellectual attempts to understand a strange incident, and at the same time and in the “mysterious Russian soul” (judgments about what it is with the soul connected bases of Russian military strategy and tactics, spoken in all seriousness). During the cold war generally relied on the experience of the Second world war, not fully understood, but it is easily extrapolated to the present. This is what American military analysts are now trying to do. From their point of view the Russian military doctrine was and there are a few distinct characteristics.
“Georgians in August 2008, tried to play a game of “mothers and daughters for money”, releasing on the first day to support the infantry all my red banner aviation. How it ended, for all we know”
First, the Russians clearly realise that in war people are killed and there is no practical sense to slow down when conducting offensive operations for each destroyed tank. Fluctuations ultimately lead to defeat and, as a consequence, to even greater losses. Secondly, support and intensification are subject to those parts and those areas that achieve success, while the loser remains alone.
In practice it looks approximately so. You have four battalions. Three come, one in reserve. At the same levelingbuy battalion successfully breaks through the enemy’s defenses, the Central – achieves local success, and the right-flank slows down and suffers losses. Question: what flank you throw the reserve as a gain? NATO officers correct answer is not given: it was necessary to forget about the Central and sevofluranom battalions, leaving a reserve to help successfully breaks pravoflangovogo. It is also desirable to collect all the artillery to the aid of the left flank. In addition, the Russian doctrine has always been based on “levels”. All incoming parts, in addition to the already existing battalion reserve, also rushed to the aid of a successful flank. So his breakthrough was intensified constantly, than increased the speed and power of the offensive. German General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin in his memoirs, belatedly argued that, for example, the Soviet bridgeheads in crossing the large rivers (the Dnieper, the Vistula) had to be destroyed in the Bud, because then they started to arrive massive reinforcements. The soldiers were transported by boats, rafts, and by swimming. Reinforcements arrived successfully no matter what. So successful breakthrough was fixed once and for all, and the next day there was nothing to do. Only to run away.
Thirdly, the Russian side attaches great importance to the massive support of the offensive artillery. Hence, the development of systems of volley fire. Surprisingly, in the armies of NATO there is still no worthy analogues of the Russian MLRS, comparable at least with the “castle”, but the Russian engineering thought in this direction has already reached the “Tornado”, after the application of which the earth was steaming a few days, and fragments of machinery spreads over a space of several football fields.
Another unexpected consequence of the awareness of the peculiarities of the Russian national war was the understanding that in the foreseeable future the Russian did not propose to fight in conditions of air superiority. The current Syria is in this sense an exception, but in principle we are talking about the great wars, not the local operations, more familiar to U.S. troops and NATO. They are all different.
With an eye on the sky
The main mistake of the Atlantic doctrines was and still is arrogance. Only in the last year began a spasmodic and excessively politicized attempt to revise psychological egregious distortions, but the overall problem will not go away. Almost the entire U.S. tactical system of land forces and Marines (despite the grandiose name and gallant history, the modern marine Corps – the same infantry as everyone else) is built on the fact that at the slightest resistance it is necessary to lie, to cause the aircraft and to wait until the road will not be treated with Napalm. In all wars involving American troops since the landing in Normandy, they worked in conditions of exceptional air superiority. And anything else just don’t know, never seen and apparently not present even on a theoretical level.
Perhaps this partly explains the total failures of all foreign armies, who trained under American patterns or under the supervision of American instructors. The American “five-star” terms of infantry combat, when every company is watching a squadron of F-16, and even better-class cruiser “Ticonderoga”, is not applicable in the army of Iraqi, Georgian, Afghan or, forgive me, Lord, Ukrainian. Taught American and British instructors their smaller brothers in Vaziani and Yavorov? Competently use modern means of communication and first aid. That is time to call in the aircraft and to minimize losses. To come under such “introductory” is impossible, and none of these armies are, in principle, no aircraft, capable of playing the role of perpetual babysitter for handicraft infantry combat-trained land forces.
Georgians in August 2008, tried to play a game of “mothers and daughters for money”, releasing on the first day to support the infantry all my red banner aviation. How it ended – we all know. Analysis of the war serves as a living illustration of all of the above. Two Russian columns of slipped through the Georgian troops, developing the offensive on that site, which was the weakest (Tbet village), not being distracted by others. In the result, the Georgian army just collapsed, restricted to a (essentially random) ambush from Nikozi. Yes, this story had a lot of tactical errors, but for eight years they were completely eliminated, especially since it was almost the first experience of active offensive operations with extremely tight schedule forward. Chechen campaign is not in the bill. The first basically demonstrated the mass heroism of the personnel at the tactical incompetence of the senior command level, and the second took place in very different political conditions.
Another example is the war in the Donbass, which led to the loss by Ukraine of its air force in record time, faster only Israeli commando Uganda aircraft at Entebbe airport were destroyed. None of the Ukrainian rear airfields bombed, the same as the Israelis of the Arabs in the six day war. The aircraft was just shot down. The more Ukrainian helicopters, for example, and altogether behaved as if they are being filmed in a Hollywood action movie – flying low, photogenic, accompanying the column, the parade marching on highways. A separate song – sending a huge military transport planes straight to hell, for example, in Lugansk airport in the summer of 2014, when the Il-76 was brought down with the reinforcements of paratroopers ordinary hand rocket.
No air superiority of the NATO countries and the United States at the time, has led to distortions in the military-industrial complex and R & d Russia. If during the period of the great Patriotic war, as in Stalingrad, in the words of General Chuikov to “cuddle” with the enemy, shortening the distance to melee, just to avoid German air raids, but now the game is quite different. First in USSR and then in Russia an exceptional pace began to develop air defense, became the best in the world, surpassing all examples of the US and NATO as a whole. It is the natural distortions of military doctrines. For example, in response to the unprecedented build-up of the Soviet Union with tanks and other armored vehicles in the United States rapidly developed anti-tank weapons.
Everything else now NATO troops and the United States are not confident in your exceptional air superiority, since the military qualities and capabilities of new Russian aircraft models still remain a mystery. The operation in Syria has left more questions than answers, and the frontline clash of equivalent quality and characteristics of the force can lead to unpredictable results. Moreover, in the European theater Russia in the immediate area of contact has a qualitative advantage, if we consider all of our air defense system. And that NATO is only capable of a slight increase in its presence close to Russian borders, largely due to fear and unwillingness to provoke a reciprocal strengthening of the Russian contingent in the region.
Our strength and our weakness
“Seven tanks “Abrams”, sailed for exercises in Georgia are considered a formidable force”
When modeling abstract ground collision doctrine decisive attack, support the successful parts and the concentration of artillery fire was able to overturn the resistance of any army, trained and equipped by the standards of the US and NATO. Most importantly, adhering to the traditional and well-established system of military thinking. No one says, as in the Brezhnev era, “Soviet army 48 hours to reach the English channel” (this is a known horror story, is not feasible in practice, but propaganda justified). Costs of the Russian strategy and military system as a whole is also known. The first is an inflexible system in the rear, which did for the last 15 years, but the output is still nonsense turns out. But the sudden check of combat readiness in the last two years were largely focused on practicing efficient movement of troops to a considerable distance and especially in unfamiliar territory. The surprise caused the transfer of large units of, say, the Western district in the East and Vice versa finally took effect. For example, it’s missing the famous clusters of tanks on the ferries without a drop of fuel – the dream of the Sukhoi. In parallel, the reformatting and upgrading of military transport aircraft, and attracted to the teachings of the civil administration that significantly reduced still the usual chaos on the Railways. And it’s not talking about creating a blank space on the Arctic command, it critically dependent on the supply and transport aircraft.
Distances and horrendous problems with transport when commitment to a layered system of organization of the army – the Achilles ‘ heel of the Russian doctrine, and now to overcome it spent huge energy and money. This is a systemic problem that requires much more effort than the increase in flight hours of pilots or even costly re-equipment, because it directly affects civilian control system that does not always understand what it achieve.
You have to understand that Russian military doctrine (not in its writing, politicized version, and in practice) over the past 15 years has evolved considerably, while the us (and NATO in General) remained in the 80-90-ies. First and foremost in ensuring air superiority and “easy win” without the infantry combat and losses. Yes, the Russian operation in Syria is still in the framework of the conflicts of the last 20 years, when the technological advantage was considered the main condition of victory. But in how the actions of the Russian troops and the Syrian army were clearly visible manifestations of the above-described elements of the strategy that led to a rather rapid change in the situation in favor of Damascus, without the introduction of Russian ground war techniques of one only of the use of aircraft would not be enough. While the Syrian troops took these methods did not immediately: there was a time when the Syrian General staff due to the inertia of thinking, and sometimes for political reasons, could not adequately coordinate their actions and to adjust to new rules of the game.
In turn, the American military thought is still in the usual state of a short air war against the third world. Seven tanks “Abrams”, sailed for exercises in Georgia are considered to be a formidable force, but it can be left to the conscience of the Georgian government staged from meaningless show event on a global scale. About the same story was propaganda and with the famous March of the 2nd armored cavalry regiment of the US army from the Baltic States to the Czech Republic a year ago. In Lithuania was going on a regular basis to keep five tanks, and now they reinforce the infantry battalion. And in that set of toy soldiers, which is called the Georgian army, a hundred people will receive certificates confirming the right to participate in NATO peacekeeping operations. In 2008 trained by the Americans 1st infantry brigade of the Georgian army ran it first.
Now we’re not talking about naval doctrine about the use of high-precision weapons or future weapons systems types of hypersonic missiles, and nuclear weapons. Yet ever since the middle Ages technological military advantage is not determined by the results of large-scale military conflicts (unless, of course, we are not talking about the lag of the century, as in the case of Indians). No one is saying that we such a collision is expected, but the overall state of readiness has not been canceled. War games held in the Pentagon – proof. In Russia, they also held. Only the goals are quite different.Related posts: